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Planning For Same-Sex Couples In 2011
Patricia A. Cain
A.  Overview Of Recognition Versus Non-Recognition 
States
1.  States That Recognize Same-Sex Marriage. Five states and 
the District of  Columbia currently recognize same-sex 
marriages celebrated within their borders. California 
recognizes some same-sex marriages celebrated within 
its borders.
 a.  Massachusetts—see Goodridge v. Department of  Public 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
 b.  Connecticut—Kerrigan v. Comm’r of  Public Health, 
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 c. Iowa—Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 
2009).
 d. New Hampshire—by statute.
 e. Vermont—by statute.
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 f. District of  Columbia—by statute.
 g.  California—Approximately 18,000 same-sex couples were married in California between June 16, 
2008, and midnight of  November 4, 2008 (the date of  the general election that passed Proposition 
8 stating that “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”). 
California has also passed a statute, S.B. 54, that recognizes all valid marriages from other states 
post-November 4, 2008, as entitled to the same rights, privileges, and responsibilities of  marriage, 
but not the name “marriage.”
2. States That Recognize Valid Foreign Same-Sex Marriages
 a.  New York—Valid foreign marriages are recognized for most purposes, although not for state in-
come tax purposes. There is no direct authority that covers recognition for state estate tax pur-
poses.
 b.  New Jersey—Marriages have been recognized for purposes of  divorce, but not for other purposes.
 c.  Maryland—The Attorney General issued an opinion in 2010 that valid out-of-state same-sex mar-
riages should be recognized under Maryland law.
 d. New Mexico—The Attorney General issued a recent opinion that New Mexico would recognize 
valid out-of-state same-sex marriages.
 e.  California—California recognizes valid out-of-state same-sex marriages that pre-date Proposition 
8, November 4 (midnight), 2008.
3. States That Recognize Spousal Equivalency
 a. New Jersey—civil unions.
 b. California—registered domestic partnerships (includes rights to community property).
 c. Oregon—domestic partnerships.
 d. Washington—domestic partnerships (includes community property).
 e. Nevada—domestic partnerships (includes community property).
 f. Illinois—civil unions (effective June 1, 2011).
 g. Hawaii—civil unions (effective January 1, 2012).
4. States That Recognize Status, But Only Provide A Handful Of  Rights And Obligations
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Hawaii Reciprocal 
Beneficiaries
Couples must opt 
for either civil 
union or reciprocal 
beneficiary
Created by legislature in 1997 in response to marriage case 
litigation
Available for any two people who cannot marry and not 
just same-sex couples (for example, sisters can register)
Limited rights, but does include inheritance and ability to 
own property as tenants by the entirety
Maine Domestic 
Partnerships
Limited rights
Enacted in 2004
Maryland Domestic 
Partnerships
Limited rights (medical and taxation)
Enacted in 2008 (effective 7/1/2008)
District of  
Columbia
Domestic 
Partnerships
First enacted in 1992, but not funded
2002—health benefits for government employees enacted
Additional medical, inheritance, and similar rights have 
been added, most recently in 2008, bringing the status 
closer to full parity with marriage
Status is retained even though DC now recognizes 
marriages
Colorado Designated 
Beneficiary
Creates a central registry where a person can indicate a 
beneficiary (including different beneficiaries) for various 
types of  rights
Wisconsin Domestic 
Partnerships
Limited rights
5.  State Constitutional Amendments Banning Same-Sex Marriage. Many states have adopted constitutional 
amendments regarding same-sex marriage. Some of  these amendments (such as California’s) ban only 
same-sex marriage; others (such as Georgia’s) ban any sort of  relations between same-sex couples.
 a.  Hawaii was the first state to adopt a constitutional amendment. It was adopted in the midst of  the 
state litigation over the right to marry. The amendment does not ban same-sex marriage. Rather, 
it leaves the definition up to the legislature.
 b. The chart below indicates how many states are restricted by constitutional amendments.
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States that do not currently 
recognize marriage and are free to 
adopt marriage by legislative act 
(no constitution prohibition)
States that have 
constitutional amendments 
prohibiting marriage 
equality
States that have constitutional 
amendments prohibiting any 
recognition (for example, 
prohibiting RDPs and civil unions 
as well as marriage)
Delaware
Hawaii*
Illinois
Indiana
Maine
Maryland
Minnesota
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
*Hawaii has a constitutional provision 
but it does not ban marriage. It says that 
the legislature shall define marriage. 
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
Oregon
Tennessee
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Nebraska
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wisconsin
B. Overview Of Types Of Problems That Arise Under Existing Law
1.  Non-Recognition States. Most states do not recognize the status of  same-sex couples no matter how com-
mitted they are. As a result, tax law treats such partners as strangers. This is not a true reflection of  
the reality of  their lives. Applying tax rules that do not recognize the reality of  the couple’s property 
sharing and support for each creates both benefits and detriments. (For example, a two-earner couple, 
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filing as single or as single and head of  household, avoids the marriage tax penalty, but is burdened by 
the estate and gift tax rules.)
2.  DOMA. Under the Defense of  Marriage Act, none of  the Internal Revenue Code provisions that spe-
cifically reference “spouses” or “marriage” can be applied to same-sex couples. That puts all same-sex 
couples, even those recognized as married, in a disfavored position with respect to the following issues: 
 a. No Marital Deduction For Gift Tax Purposes
   i. When one partner supports the other, the support may constitute a taxable gift, unless it quali-
fies as medical or educational payments under Internal Revenue Code §2503(e). (Unless otherwise 
indicated, all section references are to the Code.) Payment of  support in states where the couple’s 
status is recognized under state law and where state law imposes an obligation of  support should 
not be treated as taxable gifts. This difference in tax treatment depending on state family law cre-
ates geographical inequities and bad tax policy.
   ii.  Partners often acquire the principal residence together and do not always contribute equally 
to the purchase price. To the extent that one partner contributes more than $26,000 of  separate 
funds to the cost of  a jointly owned residence (50/50 ownership), that partner is making a taxable 
gift. The gift tax can be avoided by careful planning and by drafting documents that make owner-
ship in the jointly owned property proportionate to contributions. The need for extra legal work, 
however, imposes a burden on such couples. And, often, couples are not advised of  the gift tax is-
sues at the time of  purchase or of  adding a partner to the title.
 b. No Marital Deduction For Estate Tax Purposes
   i. Spouses can accumulate property jointly during their relationship without fear that upon an 
untimely death of  the first spouse, the second spouse will have to liquidate some of  their estate 
holdings to pay an estate tax. As a result of  the unlimited marital deduction, the combined estate 
is not taxed until the death of  the second spouse, thereby creating something like a tax on wealth 
when it passes to the next generation. For same-sex couples, a tax will be levied at the death of  the 
first partner to the extent that partner’s share of  the estate exceeds the exemption amount ($5 mil-
lion as of  2011).
   ii. With proper estate planning, a same-sex couple can utilize bypass trusts to avoid a second 
estate tax at the death of  the second partner. In such cases, the tax on the couple will similarly be 
levied only once at their generation.
   iii. However, unlike with spouses, the tax will be levied at the death of  the first to die, rather than 
at the death of  the second to die. Although the $5 million exemption makes this a limited problem 
for other than the very wealthy, consider a wealthy same-sex married couple whose principal resi-
dence is the main asset and is valued at more than $10 million. Even after the exemption, the tax 
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due on the home alone will be 35 percent of  $5 million, or $1,750,000. That may seem a high price 
to pay to stay in the family home.
 c. Section 1041 Only Applies To Spouses And Ex-Spouses
   i. Section 1041 makes transfers incident to divorce non-taxable for spouses. But under DOMA, 
this section will not apply to same-sex spouses or similar couples. As a result, couples will be sub-
jected to the same income tax rules that faced spouses before the passage of  section 1041. If  the 
pre-1041 rules are applied consistently, same-sex couples in community property states may be 
able to split their community estate free of  income tax and gift tax (discussed in more detail below). 
Tax-free divisions may also be available for couples in non-community property states as long as 
their property divisions are basically equal divisions of  property that was jointly owned during the 
relationship. But for couples in which one partner was the breadwinner and the other stayed home 
to take care of  the children, a taxable event is likely in non-community property states (discussed 
in more detail below). Again, this creates a geographical inequity that seems inconsistent with a 
uniform tax rule throughout the country.
 d. Sections 71 And 215 (Alimony And Child Support) Only Apply To Spouses
   i. The first statutory provisions regarding taxation of  support payments made incident to di-
vorce were enacted in the 1940s. They have evolved over time into the current versions of  sec-
tions 71 and 215. But these statutes, by their terms, only apply to spouses and ex-spouses. Under 
DOMA, they cannot apply to same-sex couples, even those who are married and getting a divorce 
under state law. For couples who are divorcing in states where their relationships are recognized, 
there is a strong argument that the payment of  alimony has no tax effect on either party. That is, it 
should not be taxable to the recipient or deductible by the payor. That is the rule that was in effect 
before the statutory changes in the 1940s. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), discussed in D.1.b 
below.
   ii. No independent rules outside of  section 71 deal with taxation of  child support, although ev-
eryone assumes that such payments are not income if  paid to the custodial parent. The principal 
in Gould supports this result for state-imposed obligations of  support. But in non-recognition states, 
where the paying partner is not recognized as a legal parent, the transfer could either be consid-
ered income to the party who receives it or a gift under section 102. In the worst possible world, 
such payments could be considered income to the recipient and a possible taxable gift by the payor. 
(Note: The test for what is a gift under the income tax is different from the test for what is a gift 
under the gift tax. See Part D below.)
3.   Other IRC Issues. Another set of  problems arises because the Internal Revenue Code has been amended 
over time to deal with issues faced by married couples. No amendments have been made to take 
into account the existence of  unmarried same-sex couples who have virtually the same rights and 
responsibilities as spouses. In addition to those who are married, but not recognized as such because 
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of  DOMA, such couples include registered domestic partners (RDPs) in California, Oregon, Wash-
ington, Nevada, Hawaii, and Illinois who have basically the same rights and obligations as spouses, 
and parties to a civil union in New Jersey and Illinois, who similarly are spousal equivalents. A number 
of  other states recognize registered couples, but provide them with only a handful of  rights and obli-
gations (for example, Maryland, Maine, Wisconsin, Colorado, and the District of  Columbia, where 
same-sex couples can also opt for marriage, and Hawaii, where same-sex couples can opt for either 
civil unions or reciprocal beneficiary status). The Code and the interpretive regulations and rulings 
of  the IRS simply do not address a number of  the issues that are raised by these state-recognition-of-
status laws. Here are some examples:
 a.  Section 2040 provides a special rule (discussed in C.1.b.iii below) for estate inclusion of  property 
held as “joint tenancy with right of  survivorship by the decedent and any other person, or as ten-
ants by the entirety by the decedent and spouse.” Does this rule apply to property held as “commu-
nity property with right of  survivorship”? Does it apply to property held as tenants by the entirety 
with a non-spouse?
 b.  Spousal gifting that created a tenancy by the entirety (TBE) used to be covered by section 2515, 
but that section has been repealed. This leaves no guidance for how to value a TBE interest that is 
gifted in states where unmarried couples (or same-sex spouses) can create TBE interests. Because 
TBE properties are not unilaterally severable, the valuation formula is different from that applied 
to joint tenancy with right of  survivorship.
 c.  The IRS has recently recognized that the community income of  RDPs in California is owned 
50/50, and under the principles of  Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (discussed in C.1.d below), 
each partner (or spouse) is required to report 50 percent of  any such income. Decades ago, we 
learned of  a problem that arose for certain community property spouses who filed separate re-
turns (married filing separately) and failed to report the required 50 percent of  income earned or 
acquired by the other spouse. Had these spouses filed jointly, they would have been able to satisfy 
the statutory provisions for innocent spouse and been relieved of  the liability for tax on income 
that they neither knew about nor benefitted from. But, having filed separately, this innocent spouse 
provision was not available to them. Nor was the United States Supreme Court willing to cease 
applying the basic principle of  Poe v. Seaborn in such cases. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 
(1971). Thus, Ms. Mitchell was liable for taxes on 50 percent of  the community income that her 
husband had hidden from her. Congress responded by enacting section 66 to provide relief  similar 
to the innocent spouse provisions to persons in the position that Ms. Mitchell found herself  in. That 
statute, however, only applies to spouses. As a result, an innocent RDP (or same-sex spouse) might 
be in the same position as Ms. Mitchell.
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C. Acquisition And Ownership Of Property During The Relationship
1.  Title To Property. If  a couple wants to own real estate jointly, there are a number of  different ways to 
accomplish that. Each of  the forms of  ownership listed below creates its own unique tax issues. Many 
of  these issues apply to ownership of  personalty as well as realty. Joint bank accounts, however, have 
their own rules and thus do not generally raise any of  the gift tax or similar issues discussed below. 
For gift tax purposes, joint bank accounts are treated as revocable gifts. Thus, creating a joint account 
does not result in a completed gift for gift tax purposes. But if  one partner withdraws more than that 
partner contributed, there may be a completed gift at that time. It depends on the intent of  the parties 
and the state law rights in the depositor to demand his or her money back. In any event, keeping track 
of  these transfers is in many situations virtually impossible.
 a.  Tenancy In Common. In a tenancy in common, the partners (or spouses) each own an undivided inter-
est in the whole. They can own these interests in any proportion. Often couples wish to own prop-
erty in proportion to their contributions to the purchase price. If  they do this, no taxable gift occurs 
upon formation of  the tenancy in common. If  one person is already the owner and wishes to sell 
an undivided interest to his or her partner, there may be taxable gain. If  the sale is of  a principal 
residence that qualifies under section 121 for nonrecognition of  gain, up to $250,000 of  gain can 
be excluded. Note, however, that this is a single exclusion of  $250,000 for this seller on this resi-
dence. If  $100,000 of  the gain is excluded, upon a later sale the original owner can exclude only 
an additional $150,000. The partner who buys in, however, will still have a $250,000 maximum 
exclusion amount on this residence. Other tax points: 
   i. If  the sale is of  property other than a principal residence, the gain may be deferred if  the 
sale is structured as an installment sale. Interest should be stated on the installment note to avoid 
imputed interest and the section 7872 rules.
   ii. If  one partner gifts an undivided interest to the other partner, the transaction is a taxable gift. 
(Note: The IRS is reviewing deed records in California to identify transfers that look like they may 
be unreported taxable gifts.)
   iii. The value of  the gift should be reduced by a fractional share discount—for example, a 50 
percent interest in Blackacre is worth less than 50 percent of  the full market value of  Blackacre 
because it is difficult to market undivided interests in property. See, e.g., LeFrak v. Comm’r, 1993 WL 
470956 (U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 16, 1993) (20 percent discount); Ludwick v. Comm’r, 2010 WL 1850223 
(U.S. Tax Ct. May 10, 2010)(30 percent discount rejected; approximately 15 percent deemed rea-
sonable under facts; good discussion of  method of  determining discount).
   iv. If  a gift tax return is filed, the statute of  limitations should begin as long as there is a suffi-
ciently thorough appraisal.
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   v. Gifts Spread Over Several Years. Some transferors split gifts of  land into fractional shares that will 
qualify for the $13,000 per year annual exclusion. In planning for these annual gifts, it would be 
good to make the first two transfers in December and January so that you can rely on the same ap-
praisal. It is still advisable to get a statement from the appraiser that nothing has changed to affect 
the value during the one- or two-week period between the two transfers, but you will not have to 
pay for two full appraisals in this case.
   vi. Upon the death of  the first partner, the estate will include the undivided interest owned by the 
decedent. But again, a fractional share discount ought to be allowed.
   vii. If  the co-tenants additionally restrict the marketability of  the property by agreeing to waive 
their right to partition while either of  them is alive, it may be possible to obtain additional discounts 
for lack of  marketability. There is a valid non-tax reason for entering into such agreements, espe-
cially if  the property in question is the principal residence and each partner wants assurance that 
the property will not be sold without consent during his or her life.
   viii. For transfer tax purposes, the valuation of  the transferred property is not based on what the 
transferor owned or what the transferee receives. Instead, it is based on the property itself, while in 
transit, and the test is what a willing buyer would pay on the open market. See Shepherd v. Comm’r, 
283 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2002), which explains the issue as follows:
   This “in transit” valuation has been described as analyzing “the moment of  truth, when the ownership of  the [donor] 
ends and the ownership of  the [donees] begins.” United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.1962). “Brief  as is the 
instant [of  transfer], the court must pinpoint its valuation at this instant.” Id. See also Estate of  Bright v. United States, 658 
F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc) (noting valuation for estate tax purposes “to be made at the time of  the trans-
fer”).
 b.  Joint Tenancy With Right of  Survivorship (JTWROS). As with co-tenancies, if  the partners hold inter-
ests in the joint tenancy that are equal to their contributions, there is no gift upon formation of  
the JTWROS. Because some states still follow the common law rule, based on the doctrine of  the 
four unities (time, title, possession, and interest), joint tenants may be required to own the property 
50/50 (unity of  interest). There is also some risk that any side agreement that says otherwise might 
be viewed as a severance of  the joint tenancy, although the modern rule would require an intent to 
sever.
  i. The Unequal Contribution/Unequal Ownership Problem
   (1) Some states still follow the common law rule.
    (2) Some states—California, for example—require “equal shares” or “equal interests” by 
statute. See Cal. Civ. Code §683; N. M. Stat. Ann. §47-1-36; Utah Code Ann. §57-1-5.
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    (3) The modern trend is toward rejecting the “four unities” as a fixed requirement and in-
stead relying more strongly on intent of  the parties. See In re Estate of  Johnson, 739 N.W.2d 
493 (Iowa 2007); R.H. Helmholz, Realism & Formalism in the Severance of  Joint Tenancies, 77 Neb. 
L. Rev. 1 (1998). Although the issue more often arises in the context of  whether there is an 
unintentional unilateral severance, the Iowa Court quite clearly stated “we see no reason to 
distinguish our [intent-based] approach based on whether the joint tenancy is sought to be 
created, severed, or terminated.” Johnson, supra, 739 N.W.2d at 497–498.
    (4) Despite this modern trend, I would not state in the deed that the joint tenancy is held 
other than 50/50. Instead, I would draft a side agreement between the parties that does the 
following: (1) reaffirms the intent to hold the property as joint tenants; (2) provides that if  the 
tenancy is severed into a tenancy in common the shares will be in accord with contributions; 
and (3) provides that if  the joint tenancy is sold while the two joint tenants are alive, the sale 
shall be deemed a severance and the proceeds from the sale shall be distributed in accord with 
contributions.
   ii. Gift Tax Upon Formation. If  the interests are not taken in accord with contributions (for example, 
if  there is no side agreement to account for unequal contributions), the creation of  the joint ten-
ancy will be treated as a transfer subject to the gift tax. Because of  the unilateral right to sever, each 
joint tenant is considered vested with a 50 percent undivided interest. To the extent that one tenant 
did not contribute 50 percent of  the purchase price, the other tenant will be deemed to have made 
a gift.
    (1) The gift should be valued with a fractional share discount. If  the transfer creates a taxable 
gift, a valuation expert should be consulted to help set the value of  the gifted portion. As with 
gifts of  tenancy in common interests, the same considerations apply regarding splitting the gift 
over several years and providing annual appraisals.
   iii. Estate Tax At Death. One huge problem with JTWROS is the rule under section 2040 that 100 
percent of  the fair market value of  the property will be included in the estate of  the first to die un-
less the surviving joint tenant can prove original contribution to the acquisition of  the property.
    (1) No Fractional Share Discount. Because section 2040 is a special rule requiring full inclusion 
of  the property’s value in the estate, arguments regarding fractional interest discounts are 
inapplicable. Compare Estate of   Williams v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1758 (1998) (allowing 
a fractional discount in valuing, for estate tax purposes, an undivided half  interest held as 
tenants in common) with Estate of  Young v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 297 (1998) (no fractional discount 
allowed for joint tenancy property included in estate under section 2040). Thus, even if  the 
survivor can prove 50 percent contribution, the property will be valued for estate tax purposes 
at a higher value than if  it had been held by the owners as tenants in common.
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    (2) Contribution Of  Survivor Must Originate With Survivor. What if  Partner A had given Partner 
B cash and B had used the cash to purchase her part of  the home? If  B can prove her con-
tribution to the purchase price, can she reduce the amount of  the value included in A’s estate 
under section 2040? The answer is no, because B must not only prove her contribution, but 
must also prove that the contribution came from her and is not traceable to a gift of  cash from 
A. See Goldsborough v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 1077 (1978), aff ’d per curiam, 49 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1469 
(4th Cir. 1982) (mother transferred land outright to daughters; years later they sold land and 
invested proceeds in stock held jointly with mother; at mother’s death, IRS argued that full 
value of  jointly owned stock was subject to estate tax because the daughters’ contribution 
could be traced to the original gift from mother; Tax Court held that the portion of  the value 
of  the jointly owned stock traceable to the original gift of  land from mother to daughters was 
included in mother’s estate, but not the portion traceable to the capital gain on the land that 
accrued while the daughters held the property in their own names).
    (3) Adequate Records. What sort of  evidence can be offered to overcome the presumption that 
the first to die contributed everything? The regulations don’t say and there are very few cases. 
Assume that A and B made equal contributions to the purchase of  the home. Even if  they 
have accurate records of  who contributed how much to the down payment, they will still need 
to show equal contribution to the mortgage payments. However, exact records on individual 
contributions may not be necessary. Proof  that each owner had sufficient funds available to 
contribute equally and reliance on the Cohan rule—Cohan v. Comm’r of  Internal Revenue, 39 F.2d 
540 (2nd Cir. 1930) (estimation of  expenses okay for deduction purposes)—should suffice. See 
Estate of  Fratini v. Comm’r, 1998 WL 525500 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug 24, 1998). See also Concordia v. 
Comm’r, 2002 WL 1964737 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 26, 2002) (commissioner challenged allegation 
of  contribution by survivor, but court ruled in favor of  survivor on the basis of  survivor’s tes-
timony, which was corroborated and uncontradicted).
    (4) Additional Evidence. As additional protection against the application of  section 2040, I sug-
gest that both joint tenants sign an affidavit explaining how the full purchase price of  the 
property is being paid equally by both of  them. The section 2040 presumption is rebuttable 
and once any evidence is submitted by the survivor, the burden will shift to the IRS to prove 
otherwise. I have talked to IRS personnel about this and they state that they will not rely on 
any such affidavits, but instead will seek records. That is understandable. The affidavit is not 
intended to replace records, only to supplement available records that may be incomplete.
    (5) Risk Of  Audit. A 1999 survey of  IRS estate tax attorney auditors listed non-spousal joint 
tenancies high on the list of  possible hot topics subject to audit. Because of  this viewpoint, it is 
probably wise to attach to the estate tax return some evidence of  equal contribution. It might 
help avoid an audit.
 c.  Tenancy By The Entirety (TBE) (Massachusetts, Hawaii, Oregon, Vermont, Illinois). Tenancy by the 
entirety is a common law form of  joint ownership limited to spouses. It usually is available only for 
 16  |  ALI-ABA Estate Planning Course Materials Journal  June 2011
realty. Hawaii, Oregon, and Illinois all authorize this form of  ownership for registered partners. In 
Massachusetts and Vermont, same-sex spouses can own property on the same basis as opposite-sex 
spouses. The attributes of  a tenancy by the entirety are the same as a joint tenancy with right of  
survivorship except that there is no unilateral severance. Key points:
   i. Since the TBE cannot be unilaterally severed, it enjoys a certain amount of  protection from 
creditors. In Hawaii and Vermont, for example, property held as tenants by the entirety is basically 
exempt from creditors’ claims. In Hawaii, even if  spouses (or reciprocal beneficiaries) convey the 
property away to a third party, their creditors cannot reach the property. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 
P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977). Creditors can attach entireties property in Massachusetts and Oregon, but 
they cannot destroy the nondebtor spouse’s survival rights. If  the nondebtor spouse survives, the 
creditor takes nothing.
   ii. Computing the value of  the gift for gift tax purposes is complicated by the fact that there is no 
unilateral severance for estates held as TBE. A JTWROS is valued on the basis of  two equal 50 per-
cent undivided interests (the same as a tenancy in common) because unilateral severance empowers 
each tenant to convert the JTWROS into a tenancy in common. When a TBE is created, however, 
the value of  each tenant is the sum of  two different interests in the property: (1) the value of  the 
joint life estate, and (2) the value of  the contingent remainder. If  the tenants’ ages are far apart, the 
value of  the two interests will vary more greatly. Valuation of  TBE gifts used to be covered by the 
regulations under section 2515 (covering gift tax rules for the creation of  tenancies by the entirety 
between spouses). But section 2515 has been repealed now that there is a 100 percent marital de-
duction. One might assume that the valuation rules in these regulations would nonetheless apply 
to the creation of  nonmarital tenancies by the entireties. However, there is no statute or regulation 
directly on point, probably because the Treasury and IRS have never acknowledged that same-sex 
couples can hold property as tenants by the entirety. If  claiming that tenants’ interests should be 
treated as though they were equal in value, one might cite to the fact that the disclaimer regulations 
were amended in 1997 to treat a TBE as passing a 50 percent interest in the property at the death 
of  the first spouse. See Treas. Reg. §25.2518-2(c)(4).
   iii. See also Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2, which is still on the books and gives example of  how to value 
such gifted interests. 
  iv. But valuation depended on life expectancy “factors” in Treas. Reg. §25.2515-5 (now repealed).
  v. Presumably, one would consult joint life actuarial tables to compute.
   vi. Existing caselaw on valuation of  the interest for purposes other than gift tax (for example, 
amount of  property subject to tax lien) are in conflict. See Pletz v. U.S., 221 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(joint life actuarial tables used); U.S. v. Goddard, 735 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (50 percent 
of  fair market value used).
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   vii. Estate taxation of  tenancies by the entireties is probably covered by section 2040, although it 
is worth noting that the statutory language in section 2040 refers only to “tenants by the entirety 
by the decedent and spouse” (emphasis added). If  DOMA continues to prevent spousal recognition for 
same-sex couples in other Code provisions, it is arguable that it should prevent section 2040 from 
applying to same-sex tenants by the entirety. It is probably worth noting that the IRS has tended to 
take a literal approach toward DOMA, taking the position that any statute with the word “spouse” 
in it cannot apply to same-sex couples. [See, for example, instructions in IRS Publication 555 deal-
ing with community property issues and pointing out the instances in which statutory rules that 
mention spouse are simply not available for Registered Domestic Partners or same-sex spouses.] 
In the case of  section 2040, however, it would be in the interest of  the federal fisc to include all 
same-sex couples who hold property as tenants by the entirety.  I support construing any statute 
that describes rules based on spousal property rights as rules that should be applied to all couples 
who have the same property rights, but it is not clear that the IRS would adopt that position in any 
case, and thus it is reasonable to argue that section 2040 does not apply to same sex couples who 
hold a tenancy by the entirety.  If  section 2040 does not apply, one might argue that there is noth-
ing included in the estate because at the moment of  death, the decedent does not own anything. I 
don’t think this is a more-likely-than-not outcome, however.
   viii. If  section 2040 does apply, all the points made previously with respect to JTWROS property 
are applicable.
 d.  Community Property. Same-sex (and opposite-sex) registered domestic partners in California, Wash-
ington, and Nevada can hold property as community property on the same basis as spouses. In 
California and Nevada, property may also be held as community property with right of  survivor-
ship. In Washington, spouses or registered partners who own property as JTWROS are presumed 
to own the property as community property, except that the survivorship feature of  joint tenancy is 
retained. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §64.28.040. This is a roundabout way of  creating community 
property with right of  survivorship. As long as the property is classified as community property 
under state law (even if  title is held as JTWROS), the IRS will treat the property as community 
property. See Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 206.
   i. Generally, for tax purposes, when community property is acquired during the marriage 
through the efforts of  one of  the spouses, the property is viewed as initially vested 50 percent in 
each spouse. The tax consequences that flow from this analysis assume that there is no transfer 
from one spouse to the other, even though all of  the community income may be earned by that 
one spouse. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (Washington community property law); United 
States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931) (Seaborn rule extended to California community property). 
Additionally, since all community income is vested equally in the spouses the moment it comes into 
existence, Poe v. Seaborn, rather than Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), applies to impose income tax 
liability on each spouse or partner for half  of  the community income.
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   ii. Several tax scholars, including this author, argued that the Seaborn rule should have applied to 
California RDPs as of  January 1, 2005, the first instance in which the community property rules of  
any state were extended to RDPs. See Cain, Relitigating Seaborn, Taxing the Community Income of  Cali-
fornia Registered Domestic Partners, 111 Tax Notes 561 (2006). Initially, the IRS disagreed. See CCA 
200608038, holding that earned community income from personal services must be taxed to the 
earner.
   iii. The IRS has now reversed course. See CCA 201021050 and PLR 201021048, holding that 
all community income should be split 50/50 for income tax reporting and that the creation of  
community property, even if  attributable to the earnings of  one partner, is not a transfer for gift tax 
purposes. The 2010 CCA, however, takes the position that the original position stated in the 2006 
CCA was correct at the time and that the law changed in 2007 because that was the first year that 
California authorized RDPs to report 50 percent of  personal service community income as belong-
ing to each partner for state income tax purposes.
   iv. Critique Of  IRS Position On The 2007 Effective Date For Applying Seaborn: The community property 
regime was extended fully to RDPs as of  January 1, 2005. That is the same date that RDPs began 
to be treated as spousal equivalents for most additional state law purposes. But for state income tax 
purposes, there were two special rules applicable in 2005 that were later repealed as of  2007. First, 
RDPs were not allowed to file joint returns. They were required to file state tax returns on the same 
basis as federal tax returns, which necessarily required them to file as single. Furthermore, worried 
that two couples filing singly and splitting all community income might pay a lower tax bill, a provi-
sion was included in AB 205 (the Domestic Partner Act) that provided that “[e]arned income may 
not be treated as community property for state income tax purposes.” Cal. Fam. Code §297.5(g)—
repealed as of  2007. The California legislature did not say that wages were not community or did 
not belong equally to both RDPs. All it said was that even though this is community property, you 
cannot treat it as community and thus split it for purposes of  state income tax law. This approach 
is not unlike federal legislative enactments that reverse the rule of  Seaborn in limited circumstances, 
such as section 66 (innocent spouse) and section 879(a) (nonresident aliens). But without any limita-
tion for federal income tax rules, the property law rule of  the state should be the rule that allocates 
the income—and as of  2005, that rule in California allocated community income of  RDPs 50/50 
for all purposes other than state income tax law.
   v. The IRS reluctance to recognize the full strength of  the community property interests and 
the application of  Seaborn to all such state-created property rights raises transfer tax issues for com-
munity property that can be traced to unequal earnings before 2007. Even if  the IRS wishes to 
stick with the 2007 start date for income tax purposes, it would be helpful to clarify the transfer tax 
issues with respect to pre-2007 community property.
   vi. There are many unanswered questions about how RDPs are supposed to comply with the new 
reporting requirements under the 2010 CCA. Tax return preparers are worried about unjustified 
audits because they are forced to report on single returns, which provide no indication or special 
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lines for splitting community income. In addition, although withholding taxes are to be allocated 
50/50 on the final return, the IRS (unofficial) position to date is that estimated payments, even 
if  made out of  community funds, can only be allocated to the person whose earnings produced 
the estimated tax liability. Unless changes are made, it is unlikely that RDPs in these three states 
(California, Washington, and Nevada) will be able to e-file. The IRS is proposing some changes, 
planned to take effect in mid-February 2011. These changes would make it possible to e-file, and 
to receive any refunds due, but many such returns are likely to be caught by automatic computer 
audits that are run toward the end of  2011. This is because there is no e-file box to check to show 
the other partner’s Social Security Number, and splitting withholding on vastly different income 
levels is likely to trigger a computer-generated inquiry about the return. As a result, many profes-
sional return preparers are not planning to e-file this season for their community property RDPs.
  vii. Unanswered questions for planners (as opposed to return preparers) include the following:
    (1) Estate Tax Consequences. Neither the PLR nor the CCA addresses any estate tax issues. 
Presumably, if  there is no gift tax upon formation, at death the community estate will be split 
50/50, and thus only half  will be included in the estate of  the first to die.
    (2) Although there will be a double step-up in basis for California income tax purposes, that 
rule cannot be applied at the federal level. It is a matter of  statutory law and the statute uses 
the word “spouse.” As long as DOMA is on the books, section 1014 is probably not available 
for same-sex spouses. There is an argument that the “word” spouse in the statute is descrip-
tive, not normative, and thus the provision should apply to any couple subject to a state com-
munity property regime, but it seems unlikely that the IRS will adopt this approach to statu-
tory construction.   Washington and Nevada do not have a state income tax, so the benefit of  
the stepped-up basis under state law is currently only available in California.
    (3) Will community property with right of  survivorship be covered by section 2040 even 
though it is not specifically mentioned in that provision? On the one hand, the survivorship 
feature suggests a similarity to JTWROS (and thus section 2040 ought to apply), but on the 
other hand, since this is community property, by definition it already belongs to both partners 
and there should be no reason to require proof  of  original contribution (and thus section 2040 
ought not to apply). Different considerations, however, might apply to property that has been 
transmuted from separate to community.
    (4) In community property states, spouses and RDPs can agree to change the character of  
their property. To be effective, these agreements must follow the requirements of  state stat-
utes. Transmuting property from one type to another can create taxable gifts. Although there 
is some old law on these issues involving husbands and wives, there is nothing very recent 
because the 100 percent marital deduction enacted in 1981 made this question irrelevant for 
opposite-sex spouses.
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     (A) Agreements entered into before registration can convert property to be acquired 
in the future from community to separate. Such agreements do not constitute a current 
transfer of  property and do not create taxable gifts at the time they are signed, but query 
whether they create taxable gifts at the time the conversion occurs.
     (B) Agreements that future earnings will be treated as separate rather than commu-
nity have been recognized for income tax purposes to tax only the earner. See Van Dyke v. 
Comm’r, 120 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1941).
     (C) What will the gift tax effect of  such agreements be? For example, in the year that 
A’s  $100K salary, which but for the agreement with RDP B would have been community, 
vests in A as separate property, has B made a gift of  $50K to A? I can find no authority, 
but to be consistent with the reasoning in the Van Dyke case, supra, there should be no tax-
able gift. Under state law, the agreement has successfully converted community property 
into separate ab initio, and so it belongs to A the moment it comes into existence as income 
and there is no transfer from B to A.
     (D) Agreements that future separate income from separate property will be community 
will create a taxable gift at the time the income arises and the income will be taxed to the 
owner of  the separate property. This fact situation raises a typical assignment of  income 
issue—an attempt to assign income from the property without transferring the underlying 
income-producing property. As a result, the income still belongs to the separate owner 
for income tax purposes and the transfer by agreement is a gift. See Rev. Rul. 77-359, 
1977-2 C.B. 24. See also PLR 8109032 (under a 1980 Louisiana statute, royalty income 
on separate mineral interest was classified as separate property; the law allowed spouses 
to agree to continue treating such income as community property, as it had been treated 
under pre-1980 law; IRS ruled that any such agreement would be a transmutation from 
separate to community and thus would create a taxable gift). The gift is complete when 
the agreement is signed. However, no gift tax is incurred until the value of  the gift can be 
ascertained, that is, at the time the royalty income is earned. See Rev. Rul. 69-346, 1969-1 
C.B. 227.
     (E) Transmutation of  community property to separate property after registration would 
not create a taxable gift if  the property were divided equally between the two partners. 
They would merely be receiving what they already owned albeit free of  the community 
regime. See Comm’r v. Mills, 183 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1950). But a transmutation of  community 
property into the separate property of  one partner should be treated as a taxable gift since 
it serves to transfer a 50 percent interest of  one partner to the other. See Rev. Rul. 75-551, 
1975-2 C.B. 378 (ruling that equal divisions are not taxable and implying that unequal 
divisions would be).
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     (F) Transmutation of  separate property of  one partner into community property after 
registration can create a taxable gift. Such an agreement would “transfer” vested prop-
erty rights from one partner to the other. See Damner v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 638 (1944).
     (G) Applying these general principles, there should be no gift tax consequences if  part-
ners convert a JTWROS or tenancy in common into community property, provided that 
the joint tenancy or tenancy in common was owned 50/50 and had been acquired with 
the partners’ joint funds. RDPs in California should consider owning all joint property as 
community property because under California income tax rules, the property will receive 
a double step-up in basis at death. On the other hand, since this is transmuted from sepa-
rate into community, it may be more difficult to argue that section 2040 does not apply.
 e.  Partnership. Regardless of  state property law and whether or not the state recognizes same-sex cou-
ples, any unmarried couple can form a partnership. As a general rule, the partnership has to have 
some profit-making potential. Merely owning a home together and sharing living expenses is not 
enough to form a partnership for tax purposes. See Treas. Reg. §301.7701-1(a)(2).
   i. However, if  the parties own property that they manage or if  they run a business together and 
that business includes assets, forming a partnership (or an LLC) to own the properties may cre-
ate some tax advantages. Not only will the entity provide a vehicle for joint management of  the 
property (assuming joint management is desired), the transfer into the entity of  assets that would 
otherwise be owned outright creates a significant devaluation in the value of  the transferor’s estate. 
This is because assets that are subject to the typical restrictions found in partnership agreements 
are worth much less than even the discounted value of  an undivided interest as a tenant in com-
mon. One simply cannot sell a 50 percent limited partnership interest for anything close to 50 per-
cent of  the value of  the assets in the partnership. Because of  the steep valuation discounts available 
(sometimes close to 50 percent), family limited partnerships (or LLCs) have become prime estate 
planning gimmicks.
   ii. There has been much litigation in the past few years over the role of  family limited liability 
enterprises (FLLEs) in estate planning. For a good discussion of  the key cases, see Walter D. Sch-
widetzky, Family Limited Partnerships: The Beat Goes On, 60 Tax Law. 277 (2007).
   iii. Example: Wealthy Partner (WP) owns several rental properties with a value in excess of  $8 
million. Less Wealthy Partner (LWP) has some cash or other liquid assets and is good at keeping 
the books on the rental properties. They form a limited partnership by contributing cash and the 
properties to the entity and receiving interests that are proportionate to their contributions. LWP 
has a 1 percent general partnership interest and WP has a 99 percent limited partnership interest. 
The assets in the partnership are the $8 million worth of  real estate and approximately $80,000 
in cash. The 99 percent limited partnership interest in WP’s hands is instantly worth substantially 
less than $8 million due to discounts for lack of  marketability and lack of  control. If  WP wishes to 
make lifetime gifts of  the limited partnership interests, they will be valued at the discounted value. 
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If  WP holds onto the interest until death and then transfers the interest to LWP, it will be valued at 
the discounted value. Discounts of  35 percent are typical. See 60 Tax Lawyer at 278. In this situa-
tion, merely creating the partnership could reduce the estate of  WP by almost $3 million.
   iv. As long as there is a business purpose for the creation of  the entity, the arrangement should be 
respected for gift and estate tax purposes. However, abusive use of  these arrangements has created 
some troubling precedent, especially if  the partnership assets do not consist of  property that needs 
management, such as marketable securities. Also, FLPs or FLLEs that are created shortly before 
death are at high risk of  audit.
   v. Most litigated cases involve partnerships formed by parents as a vehicle for passing wealth to 
the next generation, but there is nothing to prevent the arguments made by the IRS in those cases 
from being applied to a partnership created by a same-sex couple. There are two potential risks if  
the entity is not formed correctly and if  the only motive for creating the entity is to reduce taxes.
    (1) The Section 2036 Problem. Section 2036 has been successfully applied by the IRS to erase 
the estate tax savings potential of  these arrangements if  under the arrangement the transferor 
(usually the parent) has retained the right to income or enjoyment of  the property. When 
successful, the IRS has been able to show that there was an understanding among the par-
ties (parents and children) that the transferor could withdraw assets from the partnership if  
needed or continue to live in the home (when that was transferred to the partnership). One 
key fact in the cases that find section 2036 applicable is the fact that the parent did not retain 
sufficient assets to support him- or herself, in which case naturally the partnership assets would 
be expected to be available as needed. See, e.g., Estate of  Strangi v. Comm’r, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 
2005); Estate of  Thompson v. Comm’r, 382 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2004); Estate of  Bigelow v. Comm’r, 503 
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007).
     (A) If  section 2036 is applicable, the transfer of  the assets will be ignored and the value 
of  the assets (rather than the discounted value of  the partnership interest) will be included 
in the estate at death. Of  course, section 2036 does not apply to a transfer that qualifies as 
a “bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration.” These transfers at the creation 
of  the partnership interest are not gifts. They are transfers in exchange for a partnership 
interest. Though the IRS has argued that a transfer of  assets for a partnership interest 
that is discounted for lack of  marketability and control can never be a bona fide sale for 
adequate consideration, the courts have not been willing to adopt such a per se rule. Nor 
have they been willing to adopt the taxpayer argument that the receipt of  a proportionate 
partnership interest is, in every case, adequate and full consideration. The Tax Court and 
at least three courts of  appeal have stated that, in addition to the proportionate interest, 
the transfer into the partnership must create some intangible benefit such as a “genuine 
pooling of  assets” and not just a change in form of  ownership. See, especially, Estate of  
Bigelow, 503 F.3d at 969. Bills have been regularly introduced in Congress to repeal the 
valuation and lack-of-control discounts for any transfer of  nonbusiness assets. But none 
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of  these provisions made it into the most recent tax law, which re-established the estate 
tax with a $5 million exemption level.
    (2) Indirect Taxable Gifts. Form must be followed carefully. In our example, WP must clearly 
transfer assets to the partnership well before gifting any interest in the partnership to LWP. 
Also, the assets must be transferred in exchange for the partnership interest, and an appropri-
ate capital account must be created. If  WP gifts property to the partnership, she is indirectly 
benefitting LWP and the IRS will classify the transfer of  assets as an indirect taxable gift of  
assets to LWP. Since the gift is of  “assets” rather than of  a partnership interest, no discounts 
would be available. See Shepherd v. Comm’r, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002). If  the transfer of  
assets and the gift of  the partnership interest occur too close in time, the IRS may argue that 
under the step transaction doctrine, the effect is really an indirect gift of  assets rather than 
of  partnership interest. If  the gift is characterized as a gift of  assets, the extra valuation dis-
counts will be lost (although a smaller fractional share discount should still be available as WP 
is indirectly transferring an undivided interest in the property). The IRS has lost a series of  
recent cases in which it pushed the step transaction doctrine. See, e.g., Gross v. Comm’r, 2008 WL 
4388277 (U.S. Tax Ct. Sept. 29, 2008), and cases cited therein.
 f. Revocable Trust—Advantages. Putting property in a revocable trust creates a number of  advantages. 
   i. Avoiding probate. Because the trust holds title to the property there is no need for the property 
to go through probate.
   ii. Unlike the creation of  a joint tenancy or tenancy in common, there is no taxable gift upon 
transfer to a revocable trust.
  iii. Flexibility. Trusts are generally easier to amend than wills.
   iv. Avoids the simultaneous death problem of  joint tenancies. If  one joint tenant survives the 
other for a short period of  time, the surviving joint tenant will wind up with all of  the property, 
which may then pass to that survivor’s heirs or beneficiaries to the exclusion of  the family of  the 
first joint tenant.
   v. If  the partners serve as co-trustees, or are named as successor trustees, the trust serves as a 
vehicle to manage property during disability.
  vi. Privacy. Most trusts are not a matter of  public record.
   vii. Protection against will contests. Although a revocable trust can be challenged on grounds of  
undue influence, duress, or fraud, the fact that the trust arrangement was a completed transfer of  
property at the time it was created and funded makes it a bit more difficult to challenge. If  a chal-
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lenge seems imminent, it probably makes sense to use a trust department or some other indepen-
dent trustee.
 g. Revocable Trust—Tax Issues
   i. No completed gift upon formation even though the transferor’s partner is named as a benefi-
ciary. However, if  distributions from the trust are made to the partner rather than to the transferor, 
that payment could trigger gift tax liability if  it exceeds the annual exclusion ($13,000 in 2011) and 
if  the transferor has exceeded the $1 million lifetime exclusion. Payments in discharge of  a legal 
obligation of  support of  the partner should not create taxable gifts.
   ii. Transferor continues to report income and deductions. No fiduciary return needs to be filed 
for a grantor trust.
   iii. At the transferor’s death, 100 percent of  the trust assets are included in the estate for estate tax 
purposes.
   iv. If  the trust is funded with community property, the trust document should provide that the 
property remains community property even though it is held in trust. For California RDPs this will 
protect the double step up in basis at the death of  the first partner. This benefit is only available for 
state income tax purposes.
 h. Irrevocable Trusts
   i. QPRTs And GRITs. A Qualified Personal Residence Trust and a Grantor Retained Income 
Trust are two ways to transfer property from one partner to another at a gift tax savings. Example: 
Partner A transfers in trust a $4 million vacation home to Partner B but retains a beneficial interest 
in the trust for 10 years. The value of  the gift is discounted to account for the fact that the transfer 
is of  a future interest, which is worth less than $4 million. The transfer also freezes the value of  the 
property for transfer tax purposes. If  the transferor survives the 10-year term, the asset will not be 
included in the estate. If  the transferor fails to survive, the vacation home will be taxed at date of  
death value, which is the same result as not making the transfer in the first place. If  the asset escapes 
estate tax it will not receive a step up in basis at death. (Note: For opposite-sex married couples the 
only type of  GRIT allowed is a QPRT.) 
   ii. GRATs And GRUTs. Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts and Grantor Retained Unitrusts are 
arrangements similar to GRITs, although the transferor might provide for the retained interest in 
these sorts of  trusts that is much larger over a shorter period of  time—for example, a transfer of  
$100,000 worth of  stock with a three-year retained interest of  $30,000 a year, or 30 percent of  
the stock per year. This works well if  the stock is expected to appreciate rapidly over the next three 
years. The gift will be discounted to present value of  the $10,000 (or 10 percent) remainder interest 
for gift tax purposes, and at the end of  the three-year term, if  the stock has appreciated, the donee 
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will benefit from ownership of  the appreciated value at no gift tax cost. If  the stock were to double 
in value, the donee would have $20,000 in value for the cost of  a gift tax on less than $10,000.
   iii. ILIT (Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust). Life insurance is a good way to plan for paying estate 
taxes when the wealthy partner dies. Since there is no marital deduction, the estate tax cannot be 
avoided if  the estate exceeds the credit shelter amount ($5 million as of  2011). As long as someone 
other than the insured is the owner of  the policy, the proceeds will not be included in the taxable 
estate. One option is for the partners to own policies on each other’s lives (assuming you have two 
taxable estates). But when a partner dies, the value of  the policy owned by that partner (cash sur-
render value) will be included in the estate of  that partner. You also have to worry about where the 
policy goes at that partner’s death. Does it go back to the insured? If  so, you will not avoid inclusion 
in the insured’s estate. For some clients this is not really an issue if  the policy is a term policy (virtu-
ally no value) and the only reason for taking out the insurance was to cover estate taxes on the first 
to die. But if  the intent is to keep the policy in force, it would be better to have the policy owned 
by an irrevocable trust. Trusts don’t die. If  the insured is funding the trust to pay for the premiums, 
there may be taxable gift issues since the transfer to the trust is not a present interest. The best way 
to avoid the current gift tax is to create a Crummey power—a right of  withdrawal—in the other 
partner. The right to withdraw a sum from the trust creates a present interest and will qualify for 
the $13,000 annual exclusion.
   iv. IDGTs. The point of  an intentionally defective grantor trust is for the transferor to retain a 
power over the trust to make it a grantor trust, but not a power that would include the trust in the 
transferor’s estate. One possibility is to retain a nonfiduciary power to substitute assets. This makes 
the trust a grantor trust under section 675(4)(C). But the power does not cause the trust assets to 
be included in the grantor’s estate. See Rev. Rul. 2008-2, 2008-1 C.B. 796. The full value of  the 
trust assets is gifted to the partner as a beneficiary of  the trust, including the trust income. But the 
grantor pays the income tax on the trust income. And payment of  tax on income that is distributed 
to the partner is not an additional gift to the partner because the income is treated as income of  the 
grantor under the grantor trust rules.
   v. CRATs And CRUTs. These are charitable remainder trusts (CRTs). In a charitable remainder 
annuity trust (CRAT), the retained income interest is expressed in terms of  a fixed amount or 
annuity. A charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT) expresses the income as a fixed percentage of  
the value of  the trust assets, valued annually. Because the return will increase as the value of  the 
assets increases, the CRUT is used as a vehicle to keep up with inflation. There are restrictions on 
the size of  the retained income interest to ensure that the remainder interest to charity will not be 
eradicated by contingent withdrawals for named beneficiaries, etc. CRTs can be set up during the 
donor’s lifetime if  an income tax deduction is desirable, or they can be created at death with the 
income interest assigned to the partner. The trust will produce a charitable deduction to the estate, 
which is of  interest to couples who do not have access to a marital deduction.
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D.  Specific Tax Issues For Same-Sex Married Couples, Registered Domestic Partners, And 
Parties To A Civil Union: More Detailed Discussion
1. Income Tax Issues
 a.  Property Divisions At “Divorce.” Divisions of  property at “divorce” may be taxable under U.S. v. Davis, 
370 U.S. 65 (1962). Section 1041 of  the IRC provides that spousal transfers, during marriage or 
incident to divorce, are not taxable. By its terms the provision only applies to spouses and not to 
RDPs. Under DOMA, the provision only applies to opposite-sex spouses. Before the enactment of  
section 1041 in 1984, transfers of  appreciated property at divorce often created taxable exchanges 
under the reasoning of  U.S. v. Davis (holding Mr. Davis taxable on the gain recognized when he 
transferred appreciated stock in exchange for Mrs. Davis’s release of  her marital rights). Between 
1962 and 1984, however, a number of  courts ruled that property divisions incident to divorce were 
not always taxable. To avoid tax under the Davis rule, the spouses both had to have ownership inter-
ests in the marital property. This ownership was easy to establish for community property spouses. 
Early, pre-Davis case law had established that equal divisions of  community property at divorce 
were not taxable events. See Walz v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). See also Carrieres v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 
959 (1975), acq. in result, 1976-2 C.B. 1, aff ’d per curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (nontaxable di-
vision of  community property, but gain recognized to extent separate property was exchanged for 
community interest); Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976-1 C.B. 213 (citing additional cases in accord). In com-
mon law property states, wives who were not on the deed were sometimes found to have a sufficient 
equitable interest in the marital property to apply the tax rules applicable to community property 
spouses. See Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1973),  aff ’d, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 
1975) (split of  marital property under equitable division rules is a nontaxable division of  jointly 
owned property provided wife has sufficiently vested interest); Collins v. Comm’r, 412 F.2d 211 (10th 
Cir. 1969) (applying Oklahoma law and holding division of  marital property non-taxable after U.S. 
Supreme Court remanded for decision in keeping with property rights announced by Oklahoma 
Supreme Court). In a related case, it was determined that when the wife later sold the stock she had 
a gain calculated on the stock’s carryover basis. But see U.S. v. Wallace, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971) (applying Iowa law and finding wife was not sufficiently vested in 
property; husband recognized gain under the Davis rule).
   i. Ultimately the IRS agreed with the courts. See Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (“An ap-
proximately equal division of  the total value of  jointly owned property in a state that is not a com-
munity property state, under a divorce settlement agreement that provides for transferring some 
assets in their entirety to one spouse or the other, is a non-taxable division and does not result in 
the realization of  gain or loss.”) The legal argument is that there is no realization when two partners 
make an equal division of  their jointly owned property. The same argument can be used to support 
non-realization in property divisions between same-sex spouses and registered domestic partners.
   ii. See also GCM 37716. This is an internal memorandum from the Chief  Counsel, IRS, ad-
dressing the questions finally resolved in Revenue Ruling 81-292. The memo offers its rationale for 
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treating married couples differently from unrelated individuals. Observation: Unmarried cohabitants 
at “divorce” are more similar to married couples than to unrelated individuals. See especially footnote 
2 of  GCM 37716 (making the distinction between property divisions incident to the dissolution of  
a relationship and ad hoc property divisions between unrelated individuals).
   iii. Conclusion: Even though section 1041 cannot apply to same-sex spouses or partners, a prop-
erty division is not necessarily a taxable event under U.S. v. Davis, supra. The transfer of  appreci-
ated property can be characterized as a tax-free division of  jointly owned property if  there are 
sufficiently vested ownership interests for both spouses. This characterization is not limited to com-
munity property states. Couples in equitable division states may be able to rely on pre-§1041 cases 
from common law states provided that the partners can be characterized as co-owners. In some 
cases, even though title was held in the name of  the husband, the wife’s interests were found to be 
sufficiently vested to avoid the U.S. v. Davis characterization. Cases include Imel, supra (Colorado 
law); Collins, supra (Oklahoma law); and McIntosh v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 31 (1985) (Montana law). But 
if  the state’s equitable division statutes give the judge too much discretion in dividing the property, 
the spouses will not be considered co-owners. See Wiles v. Comm’r, 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 996 (1974) (Kansas law). Instead, the transferor will be treated the same as Mr. Davis and 
taxed on any appreciation in the property transferred.
  iv. Revenue Ruling 81-292 concluded as follows: 
   An approximately equal division of  the total value of  jointly owned property in a state that is not a community proper-
ty state, under a divorce settlement agreement that provides for transferring some assets in their entirety to one spouse 
or the other, is a non-taxable division and does not result in the realization of  gain or loss. 
   That is, the ruling itself  was not limited to community property. This ruling has never been re-
voked.
   v. Although DOMA prevents direct application of  this ruling (because it mentions spouses), the 
reasoning in the ruling seems correct and stands for the principle that when a couple is dissolving 
a relationship and distributing out the jointly owned property, the fact that the distributions are not 
pro rata does not affect the underlying tax characterization as a non-realization event.
   vi. See also Reynolds v. Comm’r, 1999 WL 109618 (U.S. Tax Ct. Mar. 4, 1999) (cash payments in 
settlement of  cohabitant’s claim to property acquired during the relationship; IRS argued payment 
for services, taxpayer argued excludable gifts under section 102; court held that the payments were 
for property and did not exceed claimant’s basis). The court held that the non-titled partner had an 
equitable interest in the property, which she was exchanging for cash. Under this characterization 
of  the transaction, had the partners merely divided the property equally, presumably the transac-
tion would have been a non-taxable division of  property. Instead, because she received cash pay-
ments, the transaction was treated as a sale. The court held that she recognized no gain because 
there was no evidence that her basis in the property interest was less than the amount realized.
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   vii. U.S. v. Davis, supra, focused only on the income tax consequences to Mr. Davis. Some years lat-
er, the IRS issued a revenue ruling that covers spouses such as Mrs. Davis. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 
C.B. 63, held that when a wife receives property at divorce in exchange for her dower rights, she 
has no income and takes a basis equal to fair market value. (See also footnote 7 in the Davis case, 
noting that the IRS administrative practice was to treat the wife’s receipt of  property at divorce as 
nontaxable.) The ruling contains no rationale or justification for the conclusion it reaches, but it is 
commonly understood to be the right result under the “in lieu of ” theory. Similarly, if  a same-sex 
spouse or partner receives cash or property at “divorce” in exchange for marital rights like support 
and dower, the receipt of  the cash or property should not be taxable income since it is “in lieu of ” 
items the partner would have been entitled to enjoy tax free.
   viii. Query whether a Davis-type transfer is subject to tax under the gift tax rules. Just because it is 
not a gift under the income tax rules does not mean that it is also not a gift under the gift tax rules. 
The definitions of  “gift” under the two taxes are different. For income tax, the transferor’s motive 
is key. For the gift tax, the rule is that the transfer is a gift unless the transferor received “adequate 
consideration in money or money’s worth.” Section 2516 answers the gift question for spouses by 
providing that if  the transfer is made in settlement of  support rights or marital or property rights, 
there is adequate consideration. With DOMA on the books, this provision probably cannot apply 
to same-sex couples. If  the statute merely codifies existing “common law” of  taxation, however, 
one can argue that a similar rule applies to registered or married same-sex partners. At least to the 
extent that the transfer is in settlement of  support rights, there is a strong argument that there is no 
taxable gift. Satisfaction of  support obligations, as long as those obligations are imposed by state 
law, should not constitute a taxable gift. See D.2.g below.
 b.  Alimony Or Support Payments. Alimony payments will not be covered by sections 71 and 215. These 
provisions allow spouses to shift the income tax burden on alimony payments by including the 
payment in the income of  the payee spouse and awarding a deduction to the payor spouse. At the 
federal level, the only way to shift the tax burden on alimony payments is to comply with sections 
71 and 215, which are explicitly available only to spouses. At the state level (California, Massachu-
setts, and similar states), alimony income can be shifted on the state income tax return.
   i. It is not clear how alimony payments between same-sex spouses and partners will be taxed at 
the federal level. One possibility is to rely on Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917), for the proposition 
that the payments are not income to the recipient. It has been informally suggested that Gould is no 
longer good law because it was decided at a time when income was thought to consist only of  salary 
and rentals and similar recurring items. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), is thought 
to have changed this notion of  income for good. However, Gould can also be characterized as a case 
in which the payment was received in lieu of  ongoing spousal support, which is itself  nontaxable. 
The “in lieu of ” doctrine supports the notion that damages received “in lieu of ” something that 
would have been excluded from income should similarly be excluded from income. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 
305 U.S. 188 (1938) (damages received in settlement of  will contest suit held nontaxable because 
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they were received in lieu of  a bequest or inheritance that would have been nontaxable under sec-
tion 102).
   ii. See also GCM 37571, 1978 WL 43529, holding that support payments included in an ex-
wife’s income under section 71 continue to be included under section 61 when they are made 
beyond the period that the ex-husband was legally responsible. One interpretation of  this GCM 
could be that support payments are taxable to the recipient, either under section 71 or section 61. 
However, the IRS specifically rejected that broad rule in the GCM, and reaffirmed the basic prin-
ciple in Gould, stating:
   If  payments are made by the husband in satisfaction of  a valid support obligation, we believe the holding of  Gould v. 
Gould would bar the includibility of  these payments in the wife’s gross income, unless they were specifically included 
in her income under section 71. While Congress, by enacting section 71 and its predecessor, section 22(k) of  the 1939 
Code, intended to overrule the holding of  Gould in the circumstances described in those sections, it showed no intention 
of  rendering this holding inapplicable to a situation which was not so specifically described. Moreover, contemporary 
decisions have recognized the continued viability of  Gould in situations not covered under section 71. See, e.g. Taylor v 
Comm’r, 55 T.C. 1134, 1138 (1971).
   In other words, the payments in the GCM were not alimony because the husband was no longer 
under an obligation to continue the support payments. They were more like a windfall and thus 
taxable under section 61. If  they had been true alimony, they would have been excluded under 
Gould.
2. Estate And Gift Tax Issues
 a.  No Marital Deduction. There is no marital deduction for same-sex couples. Thus, there is no way to 
avoid the federal estate tax at the death of  the first to die. For wealthy same-sex couples, the only 
possible estate tax saving is to avoid the tax on the death of  the second partner by creating a bypass 
trust.
   i. Note: As a general rule, this means that formula funding clauses used to fund marital share 
and bypass/credit shelter trusts for married couples have no meaning for same-sex couples. As a 
result, you cannot use standard forms to draft residuary trusts for same-sex couples. There is no 
point in limiting the funding of  a credit shelter trust to the exemption amount because the excess 
will not qualify for a marital deduction. It might make more sense to put 100 percent in the credit 
shelter trust.
   ii. On the other hand, a funding formula tied to the unused GST exemption to fund a bypass 
trust that qualifies as GST exempt would make sense. The question is what to do with the rest of  
the property. If  the aim is to avoid taxes upon the second death and the survivor has property of  
his or her own equal to the exemption amount, everything should be in a bypass trust. If  taxes are 
not a major concern and the desire is to provide as much as possible to the surviving partner, an 
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outright gift or a gift in trust with a general power of  appointment or right to revoke may make 
sense.
 b.  Potential Problem With Use Of  Disclaimer Trusts. One planning opportunity for spouses is to leave the 
estate outright to the surviving spouse, but if  he or she disclaims, in whole or in part, to direct that 
the disclaimed property will fund a bypass trust that benefits the surviving spouse during lifetime 
but is not taxed at the surviving spouse’s death. The allows the couple to do some postmortem 
estate planning by deciding whether it is better for the surviving spouse to take outright and utilize 
the marital deduction or for the surviving spouse to save taxes at her or his subsequent death, in 
effect by electing to take under the bypass trust and forgo the marital deduction.
   i. Same-sex couples who want the same flexibility—that is, for the survivor to be able to decide 
whether to take outright or in trust for tax savings at the second death (there is no marital deduc-
tion to enter the equation here)—run into a problem with the language in section 2518. Section 
2518(b)(4) provides that to be a qualified disclaimer, the property must pass either to the spouse of  
the decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer. Even though the property 
passes under the terms of  the decedent’s will to a bypass trust, and through no direction on behalf  
of  the disclaiming partner, the fact that the disclaimant has an interest in the bypass trust means 
that the requirements of  subsection (b)(4) are not met.
 c.  Contingent Marital Deduction Planning. If  the primary estate plan is to avoid taxes upon the death of  
the second partner, everything should be left in a bypass trust. At this point, however, the plan-
ner should ask: What if  DOMA is repealed by the time this couple dies and their relationship is 
recognized by the IRS? If  the plan has left everything in a bypass trust, that transfer likely will not 
qualify for the marital deduction that would otherwise be available. Solution: Use the normal fund-
ing clauses to fund a credit-shelter trust (the trust can also be GST exempt) and leave everything 
else to a separate bypass trust that can qualify as a QTIP—that is, all income must be paid to the 
survivor and no one else can have an interest in the trust assets during the survivor’s lifetime. That 
means there can be no special powers to appoint corpus or income to anyone other than surviving 
spouse. Then, if  the marital deduction is available, the QTIP election can be made for that trust. 
You might also provide that if  the QTIP election is not made, the assets will instead pass to the 
credit shelter trust. See Est. of  Clayton v. Comm’r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992).
   i. Some planners are considering naming a trust protector and giving the trust protector the 
power to rewrite any provisions in the trust that may need to be rewritten to qualify a trust for the 
marital deduction. Under this approach, you could create a discretionary income bypass trust and 
charge the trust protector with dividing the trust into a discretionary bypass trust and a marital 
deduction trust by amending the terms that apply to the marital deduction trust so that it will meet 
IRC requirements (for example, mandatory income payout and no power to appoint to anyone 
other than spouse/partner). Issues include:
   (1) Who will be the trust protector? The attorney who drafts the estate plan?
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   (2) What is the potential liability of  the trust protector?
 d.  Same Sex Couples In Recognition States With Decoupled Estate Taxes. A number of  states that recognize 
same-sex couples (married or domestic partners or civil unions) have separate state estate taxes that 
are decoupled from the federal estate tax, meaning their exemption amounts are lower than the $5 
million federal exemption. New Jersey, for example, has an estate tax with a $675,000 exemption. 
(See also Connecticut, Massachusetts, Washington, and other states.) Same-sex couples subject to 
possible estate taxes in these states ought to at least consider marital deduction planning to avoid 
the state estate taxes.
 e.  Life Insurance. If  the couple has significant estate tax liability and insufficient liquidity, life insurance 
is the best way to meet the liability. It may be worth checking with life insurance professionals to see 
if  purchasing a first-to-die policy would save on the overall cost of  life insurance since the liability 
arises on the death of  the first to die.
   i. It is also important to keep the life insurance policy out of  the estate of  the first to die. If  the 
policy covers both partners, neither of  them should be the owner of  the policy. Instead, the policy 
should be owned by an irrevocable life insurance trust. The estate can then borrow the funds from 
the trust to pay the estate taxes when the life insurance pays out. 
   ii. One other point about life insurance: Often one partner will own a simple term policy on the 
life of  the other partner. In California, Washington, and Nevada, if  the policy is to be owned by 
the uninsured partner, the premium payments should come from the uninsured partner’s separate 
property to avoid having the policy classified as community property. If  the policy is a community 
asset, 50 percent of  the proceeds would be included in the estate of  the insured. If  there is no sepa-
rate property, community property should be transmuted into separate property for this purpose.
   iii. If  a partner has significant life insurance through an employer insurance plan, it is worth 
checking with the employer to see if  it is possible to transfer ownership to someone other than the 
employee. Many people assume that such transfers are not possible with respect to group plans, but 
that is not necessarily true. And in the community property states of  California, Washington, and 
Nevada, any such group insurance is likely to be community property so that only half  goes into 
the estate of  the insured if  he or she is the first to die.
 f.  Use Of  Joint Trusts. In some states, planners regularly use inter vivos revocable trusts to avoid pro-
bate. To wholly avoid probate, that means all assets (or as many as possible) must be transferred into 
the trusts. For same-sex couples who have pooled all their assets, a question often arises whether to 
use separate trusts or a single joint trust. Use of  a joint trust raises possible gift tax issues. If  the joint 
trust is drafted correctly, A can contribute A’s separate property to the trust and B can contribute 
B’s separate property to the trust. If  any of  this property is income-producing, the income should 
be allocated out to the owner of  the underlying property to avoid potential gifts between A and B. 
Both A and B should have an independent power to revoke the joint trust, and upon revocation A’s 
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property should vest in A and B’s property should vest in B. At the death of  the first partner, that 
partner’s share of  the trust should be included in his or her estate. The survivor’s share should re-
main subject to a power to revoke—that is, it should not become irrevocable—to avoid any possible 
lifetime gift to the ultimate beneficiaries under the trust. At this point, the question becomes: what 
is the benefit of  having a joint trust? 
   i. If  the assets have to be kept segregated to avoid unintentional gifts from one partner to the 
other, there really is no gain from having a single trust as opposed to two separate trusts. Husbands 
and wives do not have to worry about unintentional gifts between spouses because they gener-
ally qualify for the 100 percent marital deduction. In any event, many estate planners, even for 
husbands and wives, believe that separate trusts are safer and easier to manage. It is clear whose 
property is whose. I concur in the advice that use of  separate rather than joint trusts is preferable.
   ii. But what about couples in California, Washington, and Nevada who own community prop-
erty? California attorneys in particular use revocable trusts to avoid probate. Even those who advise 
separate trusts for each partner are reconsidering whether a single joint trust for community prop-
erty should be used. If  the property is 100 percent pure community—that is, it was community 
when acquired and has not been transmuted from separate to community—the two partners are 
equally vested in the property and all the income from the property. I do not think there is a risk if  
the trust contains only pure community property.
   iii. Thus, for clients in these three community property states who want to use revocable inter vi-
vos trusts as part of  their estate plans, the solution would be to have each partner create a separate 
trust for separate property and have both create a third, joint trust for community property.
   iv. Then, at the death of  the first partner, the assets in the separate trust would be included in 
his or her estate, as would 50 percent of  the assets in the joint trust. Where should the assets go at 
the death of  the first partner? That depends on the estate plan. If  taxes are not a concern and the 
desire is to benefit the surviving partner, at the death of  the first partner the joint trust becomes a 
survivor’s trust for the benefit of  the surviving partner. The assets in the joint trust should continue 
in that trust with full right of  the surviving partner to revoke and use all assets as he or she may 
request. And the assets in the separate trust should pass to the survivor’s trust. For joint estates un-
der $5 million (assuming the $5 million exemption continues), this plan is simple and causes no tax 
disadvantages.
   v. For couples bumping up against the estate tax exemption amount, upon death of  the first 
partner, that partner’s share of  the joint trust and separate property trust should be subject to a dis-
position provision that gives an amount to the survivor that, when added to his or her own property 
at that time, does not exceed $5 million. The remainder should be included in a bypass trust for the 
benefit of  the survivor for life and then for the children or whoever the intended beneficiaries are 
after the death of  the second partner.
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   vi. Practice Point: Do not combine community and separate property in a single trust. The tax 
consequences of  doing this for partners who cannot rely on the marital deduction are unknown. 
Although it is possible to draft in detail to allocate ownership of  the property between the two 
partners for purposes of  revocation and transfer at death, it is probably simpler to put the property 
into separate trusts. And community and separate property need to be separately identified for 
purposes of  basis step-up at death under state income tax law (California’s, for example).
 g.   Payments Of  Support And The Gift Tax. When one taxpayer supports another out of  the goodness of  
his or her heart, any amount in excess of  $13,000 per year can be classified as a taxable gift to the 
person who is being supported. The general rule is that support payments that are not required 
under state law constitute taxable gifts. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 54-343, 1954-2 C.B. 318 (father’s pay-
ments of  hospital bills and living expenses of  son and son’s family held as taxable gifts); Rev. Rul. 
82-98, 1982-1 C.B. 141 (parent support of  adult disabled child held as taxable gifts). See Robert G. 
Popovich, Support Your Family, but Leave Out Uncle Sam: A Call for Federal Gift Tax Reform, 55 Md. L. Rev. 
343 (1996); but see Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 Law & Sexuality 97 
(1991) (arguing that support payments by one partner for the joint consumption of  both partners 
should not be viewed as taxable gifts because they are not transfers of  property and such payments 
do not constitute the sort of  estate-depleting transfers that the gift tax was intended to cover). Now 
that the gift tax has been retained despite potential repeal of  the estate tax, the new justification for 
the gift tax is to protect against income-shifting gifts. Joint consumption does not shift income and 
so, similarly, such payments are not the sort of  transactions that the gift tax is intended to cover.
   i. On the other hand, when support obligations are imposed by state law, as they are for same-
sex married couples and RDPs and parties to a civil union, there should be no taxable gift to the 
extent that payments during the relationship (or at “divorce”) can reasonably be characterized as 
support payments.
    (1) There is no clear rule in the gift tax regulations saying that payments in satisfaction of  
legal obligations of  support are not taxable gifts. Such a regulation was proposed under the 
1954 Code, but never adopted.
    (2) Transfers in satisfaction of  a legal obligation of  support do not constitute taxable gifts be-
cause they are made in exchange for consideration in money or money’s worth. See Rev. Rul. 
68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (H transfers property to W incident to a legal separation in exchange 
for her release of  her support rights; to the extent the property was for the release of  support 
rights, it did not constitute a taxable gift).
    (3) As early as 1946, the IRS took the position that a release of  support rights constituted 
valuable consideration in money or money’s worth, and thus the receipt of  a sum in exchange 
for such a release would not be a taxable gift. See E.T. 19, 1946-2 C.B. 166. This E.T. was 
superseded by subsequent revenue rulings taking exactly the same position. See Rev. Rul. 60-
160, 1960-1 C.B. 374, Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414. The position taken in these revenue 
rulings was required by the United States Supreme Court opinion in Harris v. Comm’r, 340 U.S. 
106 (1950). That case, although it covered transfers between spouses, is still good law.
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    (4) Before Harris, there was an ongoing debate between the IRS and the Tax Court over 
whether transfers incident to divorce could ever be taxable gifts. The Tax Court took the posi-
tion that they could not, even if  the transfer was for property rights (for example, dower) as 
well as for support. The IRS, by contrast, continued to insist that property divisions might be 
subject to gift tax even though transfers for support were never subject to the gift tax. After 
the Harris decision, the Tax Court concluded that the IRS position was correct. See McMurtry 
v. Comm’r, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir. 1953). The key point, however, is that both the IRS and the 
courts have consistently taken the position that transfers in exchange for a release of  support 
rights can never be subject to the gift tax.
  ii. What constitutes support? 
   (1) Food, clothing, and shelter.
    (2) Something beyond the basic necessities. See Hill v. Comm’r, 88 F.2d 941, 945 (8th Cir 
1937) (husband created trust to support wife and contribute to the maintenance of  the home 
as long as they lived together; the question was whether the income from the trust was taxable 
to the husband because it discharged his legal obligation to support the wife; the court held 
that the income was taxable to the husband. The cost of  maintaining the home was $50,000 
a year. This amount was above bare necessities, but the court said: “The maintenance, opera-
tion, and upkeep of  a dwelling as a home for a man and his wife connote something more 
than the mere food and shelter for the two spouses alone. It includes a place to which friends 
and the children and other relatives of  the man and his wife may come and visit and be so-
cially entertained from time to time. So much inexorable custom would seem to dictate”).
    (3) There is very little law on the question of  where support ends and a taxable gift begins. 
See David Beck and Sheldon V. Ekman, When Does Support End and Taxable Gift Begin? 23 N.Y.U. 
Ann. Inst. on Fed. Tax’n 1181 (1965).
    (4) There is more law on what constitutes support for purposes of  the dependency exemp-
tion. Query whether the tests should be the same or at least similar.
     (A) Items of  support are not limited to necessities. McKay v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 1080 (1960) 
(singing and drama lessons for minor child).
     (B) Support can include transfers of  capital items like televisions and automobiles. See 
Rev. Rul. 77-282, 1977-2 C.B. 52.
     (C) Support may include charitable contributions made by the dependent or spouse. See 
Rev. Rul. 58-67, 1958-1 C.B. 62.
     (D) Support includes expenses for entertainment. See Muracca v. Comm’r, 1984 WL 14489 
(U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 30, 1984) (tickets to hockey games and country club expenses).
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